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Extra-legal protection in China: How guanxi distorts China͛s 
legal system and facilitates the rise of unlawful protectors 
Peng Wang

 
Abstract 
This paper incorporates the concept of guanxi—a Chinese version of personal connections, 
networks or social capital—into the discussion of police corruption and the rise of extra-legal 
protectors. Using published materials and fieldwork data collected from two Chinese cities 
;ChoŶgƋiŶg aŶd QufuͿ, it deŵoŶstƌates hoǁ guaŶǆi distoƌts ChiŶa’s legal sǇsteŵ ďǇ 
facilitating the buying and selling of public offices and promoting the formation of corrupt 
networks between locally-ďased ĐƌiŵiŶals aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials. ChiŶa’s ǁeak legal 
framework encourages individuals and entrepreneurs to employ guanxi networks to obtain 
private protection from alternative suppliers (e.g. corrupt government officials and street 
gangsters) in order to protect property rights, facilitate transactions, and fend off 
government extortion.  
Keywords 
Guanxi, corruption, extra-legal protection, quasi law enforcement, China 
Introduction 
Chinese businesses are increasingly turning to the extra-legal protection services supplied by 
organized crime groups and corrupt government officials. International scholars focus on 
two major aspects of extra-legal protection: mafia scholars emphasize the relationship 
between state failure and the rise of mafias in transitional countries and demonstrate that 
mafia groups function as quasi-governmental institutions providing private protection for 
people in need (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001; Skarbek 2014). Political scientists emphasize 
how law enforcement agencies and state security forces produce, sell and distribute 
unlawful enforcement and protection services (Joireman 2011; Volkov 1999).  
This paper identifies the reasons Chinese businesses employ extra-legal measures and offers 
an empirical study of extra-legal protection in contemporary China using fieldwork data 
collected from two Chinese cities, Qufu and Chongqing. Influenced by existing publications, 
the authoƌ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh foĐused oŶ tǁo tǇpes of eǆtƌa-legal protectors: corrupt government 
officials, especially police officers, and locally-based criminal groups. Fieldwork data agrees 
ǁith GƌaŶoǀetteƌ͛s theoƌǇ of eŵďeddedŶess, ǁhiĐh states that soĐial action and outcomes, 
iŶĐludiŶg eĐoŶoŵiĐ aĐtioŶ aŶd outĐoŵes, ͚aƌe affeĐted ďǇ aĐtoƌs͛ dǇadiĐ ƌelatioŶs aŶd ďǇ the 
stƌuĐtuƌe of the oǀeƌall Ŷetǁoƌk of ƌelatioŶships͛ (Granovetter 1992: 25). Evidence from 
China suggests that police and judicial activities are highly embedded in guanxi networks, 
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fosteƌiŶg ĐoƌƌuptioŶ aŶd iŶjustiĐe ǁithiŶ ChiŶa͛s legal sǇsteŵ. It also suggests that pƌoteĐtioŶ 
and enforcement mechanism choices are dictated by trust and reputation within guanxi 
networks. 
Using published materials and fieldwork data, this paper incorporates the concept of guanxi 
into the discussion of police corruption and the rise of extra-legal protectors. It 
demonstrates the corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi, i.e. hoǁ guaŶǆi distoƌts ChiŶa͛s legal 
system by facilitating the buying and selling of public offices and promoting the formation of 
corrupt guanxi networks between locally-based criminals and government officials. This 
paper also demonstrates the clash between guanxi and the formal legal system prevents law 
enforcement agencies from being able to provide sufficient protection for citizens, 
contributing to the rise of extra-legal protectors. The negative aspects of guanxi, emphasized 
by this paper, provide a new perspective for understanding corruption and organized crime 
in contemporary China. 
Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
The concepts 
Extra-legal protector(s) This term refers to an individual or group of people specialising in 
the provision of private protection or quasi law enforcement through violence or the abuse 
of state poǁeƌ. The ͚pƌiǀate oƌdeƌiŶg͛ theoƌǇ, ĐoŵpaƌiŶg state-sponsored law enforcement 
with alternative enforcement mechanisms, suggests four distinct types of enforcement 
mechanism—state enforcement, private-legal enforcement (e.g. private protection 
companies), private-illegal enforcement (e.g. mafia groups), and state-illegal enforcement 
(e.g. corrupt police officers) (Barzel 2000; Dixit 2004). The study of extra-legal protection in 
China should therefore focus on two types of protectors: state-illegal and private-illegal. 
Volkov (2002: 65) ƌegaƌds ͚uŶits of state poliĐe aŶd seĐuƌitǇ foƌĐes ǁho aƌe aĐtiŶg as pƌiǀate 
eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs͛ as ͚state aŶd illegal eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt͛ (also see Joireman 2011). Gambetta (1993) 
defines the mafia as a special type of organized crime group that specializes in producing, 
selling and distributing private protection. Varese (2010: 14, 17)makes a clear distinction 
ďetǁeeŶ aŶ oƌgaŶized Đƌiŵe gƌoup ǁhiĐh ͚atteŵpts to ƌegulate aŶd ĐoŶtƌol the pƌoduĐtioŶ 
and distƌiďutioŶ of a giǀeŶ ĐoŵŵoditǇ oƌ seƌǀiĐe uŶlaǁfullǇ͛ aŶd a ŵafia gƌoup ǁhiĐh ͚is a 
tǇpe of oƌgaŶized Đƌiŵe gƌoup that atteŵpts to ĐoŶtƌol the supplǇ of pƌoteĐtioŶ͛.  
Guanxi The existing literature shows no consensus on the definition of guanxi1. This paper 
follows the definition of guanxi suggested by Fan (2002): ͚guaŶǆi is the pƌoĐess of soĐial 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶs that iŶitiallǇ iŶǀolǀes tǁo iŶdiǀiduals…the pƌoĐess ǁill ŵoǀe oŶ iŶǀolǀiŶg ŵoƌe 
parties, and stop only when a solution is finally found or the task is aďaŶdoŶed͛ ;pp. ϱϰ9, 
551). There is a set of specialized terms deriving from the word guanxi. For example, a 
guanxiwang oƌ a Ŷetǁoƌk of guaŶǆi is the suŵ total of oŶe͛s guaŶǆi, ĐoŵpƌisiŶg ďoth ǀeƌtiĐal 
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and horizontal connections (Gold 1985). Guanxi practice refers to a series of social 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶs iŶǀolǀed iŶ guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌks, like ͚the eǆĐhaŶge of gifts, faǀoƌs aŶd ďaŶƋuets; 
the cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the 
manufacturing of obligation and indeďtedŶess͛ (Yang 1994: 6). 
Four characteristics of guanxi, suggested by Jiang et al. (2012), are reciprocity, utilitarianism, 
transferability and intangibility. First, Chinese have ͚a strong sense of reciprocity for 
developing friendship and saving face for theŵselǀes͛(Su and Littlefield 2001: 201); a person 
will be viewed as untrustworthy if he/she violates the principle of reciprocity. Second, guanxi 
relations are maintained through mutual exchange of favors. Guanxi is a mixture of ganqing 
(sentiments) and renqing (favors). Renqing, the precondition for establishing guanxi, 
͚pƌoǀides a ŵoƌal fouŶdatioŶ foƌ the ƌeĐipƌoĐitǇ aŶd eƋuitǇ that aƌe iŵpliĐit iŶ all guaŶǆi 
ƌelatioŶships͛ (Luo 2000: 15). Ganqing, as the ͚affeĐtiǀe ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛ of guaŶǆi, is defiŶed ďǇ 
Wang (2007: 82) as ͚ƌefeƌ[iŶg] to feeliŶgs aŶd eŵotioŶal attaĐhŵeŶt aŵoŶg ŵeŵďeƌs of 
Ŷetǁoƌks, [ǁhiĐh is] ofteŶ aŶ iŶdiĐatoƌ of ĐloseŶess of guaŶǆi͛. Thiƌd, guaŶǆi is tƌaŶsfeƌaďle. 
As Luo (2000: 10) eǆplaiŶs, ͚if A has guaŶǆi ǁith B aŶd B is a fƌieŶd of C, then B can introduce 
oƌ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd A to C oƌ ǀiĐe ǀeƌsa͛; duƌiŶg this pƌoĐess, B fuŶĐtioŶs as a ŵiddleŵaŶ. Fouƌth, 
guanxi practice follows an invisible and unwritten code of reciprocity and equity (Yan 1996). 
Guanxi is a double-edged sword. The term guanxi is applied indiscriminately by Chinese 
people to all forms of horizontal and vertical dyadic ties. Guanxi is described by Oi (1991: 
131) as ͚a speĐial sǇsteŵ of eǆĐhaŶge ďetǁeeŶ peƌsoŶs of eƋual oƌ uŶeƋual status; it ĐaŶ ďe 
clientelistic or nonclientelistiĐ͛. ClieŶtelistiĐ eǆĐhaŶges ;suĐh as ďetǁeeŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
officials and businessmen) tend to have negative effects, whereas nonclientelistic exchanges 
(such as between friends) tend to be positive.  
An important category of clientelistic guanxi is patron-client relations. These relationships 
are formed when the government lacks transparency and powerful officials control all state 
resources (Gold et al. 2002). Battersby et al. (2011) find that guanxi practices in Chinese 
ďusiŶess ŵeƌge ǁith ͚patteƌŶs of patƌon-ĐlieŶt ƌelatioŶship͛ ǁheƌe the pƌiŶĐiple of 
reciprocity and the essence of mianzi (face) in guanxi exchange violate bureaucratic norms 
and undermine the rule of law. In other words, certain kinds of guanxi are closely associated 
with corrupt behaviours (e.g. favouritism and nepotism) (Luo 2008; Wang et al. 2014). 
Although guanxi plays an important role in facilitating corrupt transactions (such as bribing 
government officials), it would be wrong to automatically equate guanxi with corruption. 
Guanxi can be benign and valuable. For example, drawing on the data collected through a 
multi-stage survey of residents, Zhang et al. (2009: 472) demonstrate that ͚ƌesideŶts ǁho 
have strong neighbourhood guanxi are less likely to be fearful of crime in contemporary 
uƌďaŶ ChiŶa͛. 
If cultural differences in network practices are set aside, guanxi in China might be equated 
with personal networking or connections in the West. The role of personal connections, 
however, differs according to whether a country has a strong or a weak institutional 
environment. The negative influence of personal connections in a transparent country (e.g. 
the UK and Germany) is limited by progressive social laws and openness of government, 
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while personal connections in an opaque country (e.g. China) are seen as corrupting the 
puďliĐ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ. OpeŶŶess aŶd tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ stƌeŶgtheŶs people͛s tƌust iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
and protects the decision-making mechanism from the demands of personal connections. 
The opaque nature of the Chinese government, however, makes it difficult to see how public 
policy is developed and how the civil service operates, creating favourable conditions for 
people to employ personal connections (i.e. guanxi) rather than formal rules to get things 
done. This negative aspect of guanxi in the context of China's weak institutional 
environment emphasises the importance of incorporating an analysis of these negative 
aspects into the examination of corruption and the rise of extra-legal protection. 
Extra-legal protection, guanxi and the PRC legal system: Hypotheses 
Chinese society has been characterized by the coexistence of guanxi and the legal system. 
Most China scholars stress the positive side of guanxi by discussing the substitutive and 
complementary relationships between the guanxi network and the legal system (Luo 2000; 
Peng 2003; Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhang et al. 2009). Guanxi has been defined as the most 
important form of informal institution in China, achieving what formal institutions are 
designed, but fail, to achieve (Xin and Pearce 1996). In the face of weak market structures, 
ill-defined property rights, institutional uncertainty, and incomplete institutional foundations, 
guanxi substitutes for formal institutional support (Nee 2000). This was especially true in the 
1980s and 1990s, but still holds true today. 
Since China gradually strengthened its legal framework and its socialist market dramatically 
expanded in the late 1990s, guanxi has gradually been transformed from a substitutive to a 
complementary informal institution (Potter 2002; Zhang and Keh 2009). This is caused by the 
limitations of guanxi-based governance. First, the guanxi network has to increase its size in 
order to meet the increasing demand from its members. When the guanxi network exceeds 
its optimal size, the ability to sanction misbehaviour is challenged and the costs of informing 
club members of the trustworthiness of all others increase (Schramm and Taube 2003). 
Second, as the market expands and the number of business partners increases, the costs of 
screening and testing a new partner also increase and switching to a new partner becomes 
riskier (Li 2003). However, transaction security offered by an institutional legal system can 
effectively deal with this problem (Buchanan 1965). In a well-estaďlished legal sǇsteŵ, ͚the 
marginal costs of enforcing an (additional) contract between an (additional) transaction pair 
are negligible due to the fact that the contract is explicit, impersonal, and standardized, and 
that the poliĐe aƌe oŶ staŶdďǇ͛ (Li 2003: 657). As a result, guanxi in the new century is 
identified as a complement rather than an alternative to the formal institutions (Dunning 
and Kim 2007; Li 2003; Schramm and Taube 2003). 
The arguments on the substitutive and complementary relationships between two systems 
of oƌdeƌ illustƌate the ĐhaŶgiŶg sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of guaŶǆi iŶ ChiŶa͛s tƌaŶsitioŶal eĐoŶoŵǇ. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, the eǆistiŶg liteƌatuƌe ŶegleĐts the Ŷegatiǀe iŶflueŶĐe of guaŶǆi pƌaĐtiĐe oŶ ChiŶa͛s 
legal system. Guanxi, as an informal institution, starts off by substituting and complementing 
formal rules, but it eventually subverts new formal institutions. A theory of institutional 
interaction suggests that informal institutions, in some circumstances, undermine and 
contravene the newly-formed or existing formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse 2010).  
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The negative impact of the guanxi network on formal institutions is derived from the 
increasing intertwinement between guanxi and corruption (Luo 2008). From the perspective 
of guanxi-based governance, the provision of certain goods and the implementation of 
transactions (between money and power) among club members are normal or even 
necessary within the guanxi network, whereas these interpersonal activities may fall within 
the sphere of corruption when they are assessed from a legal perspective (Schramm and 
Taube 2004). The influence of guanxi is not limited to business transactions; law 
enforcement and judicial activities are also highly embedded in guanxi networks (Li 2011, 
2012). The rules of the guanxi game (e.g. reciprocity and equity) encourage, even urge, 
police officers and judges to get things done regardless of bureaucratic norms and the rule 
of law. This line of thinking gives rise to Hypothesis 1: 
The embeddedness of police and judicial activities in guanxi networks results in rampant 
ĐoƌƌuptioŶ iŶ ChiŶa’s legal iŶstitutioŶs. 
The clash between guanxi-based governance and rule-based governance produces few 
positive outcomes in contemporary China. The resilience of guanxi networks undermines 
aŶd distoƌts the legal fƌaŵeǁoƌk, ŵakiŶg ChiŶa͛s judiĐial sǇsteŵ iŶeffeĐtiǀe. Moƌeoǀeƌ, 
ChiŶa fails to estaďlish effeĐtiǀe foƌŵal ƌules that ͚pƌoǀide offiĐials ǁith legitiŵate 
justifiĐatioŶ foƌ deŶǇiŶg ƌeƋuests foƌ faǀoƌitisŵ͛ (Potter 2001: 31). The absence of a reliable 
rule of law makes private firms subject to threatening interference and arbitrary extortion 
by party and government officials (Peng 2003; Xin and Pearce 1996). Both mafia emergence 
literature and the larger literature on private ordering suggest that the inability of the state 
to supply adequate or equal protection for its citizens will result in the rise of alternative 
mechanisms of protection and enforcement including state-illegal and private-illegal (Dixit 
2004; Gambetta 1993; Hill 2003; Varese 2001; Wang 2011; Wang 2013). This gives rise to 
Hypothesis 2: 
ChiŶa’s ǁeak legal system and rampant corruption prompts private property owners to 
employ extra-legal protectors (e.g. corrupt police officers and street gangsters) to 
protect private property rights, facilitate transactions, and deal with government 
extortion. 
The rise of the ŵafia iŶ “outheƌŶ ItalǇ ǁas a ƌespoŶse to ͚the aďseŶĐe of Đƌediďle oƌ effeĐtiǀe 
sǇsteŵs of justiĐe aŶd laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt͛ (Gambetta 2000: 160). Mafias are able to facilitate 
market exchanges among participants who distrust each other by enforcement of deals and 
promises (Gambetta 2000). Moreover, the mafia has thrived for centuries by continuously 
iŶjeĐtiŶg ͚distƌust iŶto the ŵaƌket to iŶĐƌease the deŵaŶd foƌ the pƌoduĐt [it] sells—that is, 
pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ ;Gaŵďetta ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϳϯͿ.  
Gaŵďetta͛s aƌguŵeŶts oŶ distƌust and the mafia may be less helpful in analysing the use of 
extra-legal protection services in contemporary China. Why do Chinese, in environments 
characterized by the absence of trust, trust criminals and corrupt government officials? 
Unlike normal market transactions, there are strong uncertainties about both the price of 
these illegal transactions and their results. The buying and selling of extra-legal protection or 
quasi law enforcement services, therefore, require a mechanism to reduce illegal transaction 
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costs, guarantee quality of services, and punish violators. In this case, guanxi as a strategic 
mechanism may be able to shelter both parties in illegal transactions. This leads the author 
to propose Hypothesis 3: 
The buying and selling of extra-legal protection services is governed by trust and 
reputation within the guanxi network. 
Data and methods 
Research sites 
All data for this study was collected from two cities: Qufu and Chongqing. Qufu, a small city, 
is the hometown of Confucius (and also the author). The author gained access to the local 
business community, the police archive and local court files. The data collected from Qufu is 
used to interpret how and why individuals and entrepreneurs resolve their troubles by using 
extra-legal protection and quasi law enforcement. The main obstacle in Qufu is also obvious: 
eǀideŶĐe aďout goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials͛ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ selliŶg illegal pƌoteĐtioŶ is eǆtƌeŵelǇ 
difficult to access as there is little archive material, and in-depth interviews would pose 
significant risks to both interviewer and interviewees. 
Chongqing, on the other hand, is one of the biggest cities in in Southwest China with a 
population of more than 30 million. The Chongqing Government under the leadership of Mr 
BX
2
 recently achieved great success with an anti-mafia and anti-corruption campaign. From 
June 2009 to November 2011, 77 government officials, including over 20 senior police 
officers, were arrested for their involvement in corrupt networks and the supply of extra-
legal protection to locally-based crime groups (Xinhua 2011). The anti-corruption campaign 
made it easier to gain access to open sources about how corrupt guanxi networks function 
and how corrupt police officers sell protection to locally-based criminal groups. 
Data collection and analysis 
The data collection in Qufu involved 22 in-depth semi-structured interviews with police 
officers, local government officials, entrepreneurs, private (illegal) bankers, lawyers and 
judges, as well as eight focus group discussions with a total of 23 interviewees including 
project managers from local construction companies, staff in local hospitals, and 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials. EŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs aŶd pƌiǀate ďaŶkeƌs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, 
provided valuable sources of data on the performance of local law enforcement agencies, 
the rise of debt collection gangs, and the importance of guanxi for private enterprises.  
During the fieldwork in Chongqing, political factors emerged as a major obstacle in gaining 
access to interviewees. According to the Chongqing government, government officials, 
aĐadeŵiĐs, aŶd eǀeŶ jouƌŶalists ǁeƌe Ŷot alloǁed to ŵake aŶǇ ĐƌitiĐisŵ of ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s aŶti-
mafia campaign.
3
 The iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ Ŷegatiǀe ƌespoŶse alŵost destƌoǇed the authoƌ͛s plaŶ of 
                                                          
2
 At the editoƌ͛s ƌeƋuest, the Ŷaŵes of all the individuals mentioned in this paper have been 
anonymised. 
3
 Journalist A, Personal Communication, e-mail message to author, 26 December 2011; Journalist B, 
Personal Communication, e-mail message to author, 26 December 2011. 
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doing fieldwork in Chongqing. However, thanks to some local connections, the author 
managed to conduct one focus group discussion with three prosecutors and two police 
officers and nine semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, prosecutors, taxi 
drivers, and a lawyer. 
The authoƌ applied seǀeƌal stƌategies to aĐƋuiƌe ŵoƌe data oŶ ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s aŶti-mafia and 
anti-corruption campaigns. First, a close teacher-student relationship enabled the author to 
conduct interviews with two criminology professors in Shanghai, who specialize in research 
on Chinese organized crime and corruption. The comments from both professors provided 
ǀaluaďle iŶsights iŶto ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s Đoƌƌupt Ŷetǁoƌks. The iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁeƌe folloǁed ďǇ 
frequent email communications with these two professors, which included thorough 
discussions on the emerging extra-legal protection market and corrupt guanxi networks in 
contemporary China. 
Second, this study benefits from open source data from China and foreign countries. The 
CNKI database
4
  provided the author with access to a large number of journal papers, news 
reports, conference papers, and doctoral theses about the Chongqing crime crackdown. 
These open materials offered rich details, but their limitation was obvious: almost all these 
publications lacked evidence of independent thinking due to strict media control in China. 
The author therefore turned to the viewpoints of Western media. In order to ensure the 
reliability of the information from Western media, the author mainly focused on news 
reports or comments published by mainstream Western media, such as The Times, BBC, The 
Economist, The Telegraph, The Guardian, The New York Times, and CNN. In particular, this 
research pays attention to a series of news articles written by notable journalists, such as 
Jaime FlorCruz and Malcolm Moore, who have lived and worked in China for many years. 
Third, after the removal of Mr BX
5
 as party chief of Chongqing in March 2012, the author 
attempted to get access to police archives and court files. Similar to the first request during 
the fieldwork in Chongqing, government officials still refused to offer any materials. The 
request for access to police records was also denied, which forced the author to adopt an 
alternative strategy. A review of existing literature helped the author to identify one law 
professor in Chongqing who has published a number of high-quality papers about 
ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s Đƌiŵe ĐƌaĐkdoǁŶ. A Đlose ƌelatioŶship ǁith the ChoŶgƋiŶg goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵaǇ ďe 
what allows this professor to obtain police and court files. The author employed his social 
networks to gain access to this law professor, but this professor refused to provide the data 
he possessed. This iŶdiĐates that ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s aŶti-mafia campaign is still a politically 
sensitive topic. 
Overall, the author carried out a total of 33 individual interviews, nine focus group 
discussions with a total of 28 participants, an extensive review of published materials, and a 
number of email communications. After data collection was completed, the author applied a 
systematic approach to the qualitative data by using NVivo software. 
                                                          
4
 The CNKI database refers to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database, which is the 
largest and most comprehensive academic database in mainland China. 
5
 Mr BX was removed from Chongqing leader post in March 2012. He was accused of abusing power, 
taking bribes and violating party discipline (Broadhurst and Wang 2014). 
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Guanxi and corruption: Evidence from Chongqing 
The fiƌst hǇpothesis posits that guaŶǆi͛s Ŷegatiǀe effeĐt oŶ the legal sǇsteŵ leads to seƌious 
corruption in contemporary China. The study of guanxi and corruption suffers from a lack of 
comprehensive statistical information because police records and court files about 
corruption cases are not available to the public in China (Guo 2008). Corruption cases 
revealed by the Chongqing crime crackdown seem different because part of the information 
about organized crime and corruption has been disclosed by the mass media. Consistent 
with the first hypothesis, guanxi undermines the criminal justice system in two ways: (1) 
facilitating the buying and selling of public offices, and (2) allowing locally-based criminals to 
create mutually beneficial networks with government officials. 
The buying and selling of public offices in Chongqing 
In China, the promotion of government officials has been largely influenced by unwritten 
rules, particularly the practice of guanxi (Shih et al. 2012; Warren et al. 2004). This 
phenomenon is mainly caused by the weak political and legal system which fails to clearly 
specify criteria for the distribution of public offices and to strictly enforce those criteria. The 
principle of reciprocity and the essence of maintaining face in guanxi practice, as Zhan (2012: 
103) deŵoŶstƌates, ͚eŶĐouƌages loĐal offiĐials to distƌiďute pƌoŵotioŶs aŶd oppoƌtuŶities to 
those Đloseƌ to theŵ iŶ the Ŷetǁoƌk͛. Moƌeoǀeƌ, the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of guaŶǆi foƌĐes iŶdiǀiduals 
(lesser cadres and ordinary citizens) to cultivate relationships with those in power. The 
following paragraphs discuss the Chongqing case, which offers the best example of buying 
and selling offices in law enforcement agencies. 
In departure from most crime crackdown campaigns conducted by local governments, 
ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s ĐaŵpaigŶ agaiŶst oƌgaŶized Đƌiŵe ͚ǁas diƌeĐted, uŶusuallǇ, at the kiŶd of 
people who count: the wealthy businessmen and powerful officials who controlled the gangs 
aŶd eŶaďled theŵ to flouƌish͛ (Economist 2009: online). The Chongqing crime crackdown 
resulted in the end of numerous corrupt networks, especially within law enforcement 
agencies, and the reshuffle of at least 3,000 police officers in order to cut their links with 
organized crime groups (Wang and Ma 2010). The most influential network destroyed by 
this crime crackdown was within the Chongqing Public Security Bureau headed by Mr WQ, 
who served as the deputy head of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau from 1992 to 2008 
and as director of the Chongqing Justice Bureau from July 2008 to August 2009.  
Mr WQ was described by most interviewees as a trustworthy person.
6
 He ƌegaƌded ͚the ƌule 
of ganqing͛ iŶ guaŶǆi pƌaĐtiĐe as ďeiŶg ŵuĐh ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ the ƌule of laǁ.7 From Mr 
WQ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the pƌoǀisioŶ of assistaŶĐe foƌ pƌoŵotioŶs of middle and lower level 
officers within his guanxi networks was normal and even necessary, but transactions 
between Mr WQ and his subordinates were clearly defined as corruption from a legal 
perspective. Unlike the legal market, in which the price determines transactions between 
sellers and buyers, transactions in the market of buying and selling offices were determined 
                                                          
6
 A journalist, Ϯ9 DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, iŶteƌǀieǁ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa; A journalist, 25 
DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, iŶteƌǀieǁ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa. 
7
 A prosecutor, Ϯϰ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, iŶteƌǀieǁ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa; A prosecutor, 21 
DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, iŶteƌǀieǁ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa. 
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by interpersonal relationships between the holders and receivers of the benefits (Schramm 
and Taube 2003; Zhan 2012). In other words, Mr WQ may feel obliged to favour the people 
in his network rather than outsiders, to favour those closer to him over the others farther 
away in his network. 
In order to secure promotions or gain better job opportunities, many middle and lower level 
police officers in Chongqing had to invest in establishing and maintaining a close relationship 
with Mr WQ. Moreover, people who were not members of Mr WQ͛s guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌks 
tended to employ a middleman—a linking person who brings a buyer and seller from 
different networks together—to facilitate corrupt transactions (Zhao et al. 2011). Mr WQ, as 
the main supplier of offices, was convicted of providing assistance for more than 20 police 
officers to gain promotion and police candidates to secure places (See Table 1).  
Table 1 Offices for Sale in Chongqing8  
 
Objective of 
Buying Offices 
 
 
Office Buyer 
 
 
Middleman 
 
 
Office Seller 
Amount of 
Money 
Transacted 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Mr WX Mr CWQ Mr WQ ¥1,190,000 
Secure a place 
in the 
Chongqing 
Public Security 
Bureau 
Mr GX Mr CWL Mr WQ ¥150,000 
Promotion Mr LL N/A Mr WQ ¥400,000 
Promotion Mr RC Mr CWQ Mr WQ ¥500,000 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job or 
secure a position 
for demobilized 
military officer 
Mr ZX 
Mr CX 
Mr YX 
Ms ZH Mr WQ ¥1,590,000 
Promotion Mr XG N/A  Mr WQ ¥126,000 
Promotion & 
maintaining 
positions 
Mr ZL N/A Mr WQ ¥270,000 
Promotion Mr LX N/A Mr WQ ¥49,000 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Mr XX Ms ZH Mr WQ ¥1,770,000 
Promotion Mr HD N/A Mr WQ ¥95,000 
Promotion & 
same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Mr WD N/A Mr WQ ¥155,000 
Promotion Mr CT N/A Mr WQ ¥60,000 
Promotion & 
same-level 
Mr XQ N/A Mr WQ ¥370,000 
                                                          
8
 This table is designed by the author according to information from news reports released by Xinhua 
News AgeŶĐǇ, the offiĐial pƌess ageŶĐǇ of the People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa. 
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transfer to a 
better job 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Mr CX N/A Mr WQ ¥30,000 
Promotion Mr ZXX Mr DG Mr WQ ¥200,000 
In the Chongqing case, relational power stemming from guanxi networks enables Mr WQ͛s 
subordinates to obtain promotions. As Shang et al. (2012) argue, relational power can be 
divided into two subcategories: direct and indirect. Direct relational power can be further 
divided into ganqing (affection) based relational power and renqing (felt-obligation) based 
relational power.  
In an affection-ďased ƌelatioŶship, ͚the leadeƌ aŶd his/heƌ folloǁeƌ soĐialize outside ǁoƌk, 
discuss personal problems and exchange adǀiĐe oŶ peƌsoŶal issues͛ (Jiang et al. 2012; Shang 
et al. 2012: 440). For example, Mr HD, Mr ZL and Mr CT, three middle-ranking police officers, 
were Mr WQ͛s ͚peƌsoŶal ďodǇguaƌds͛ ǁheŶ Mƌ WQ enjoyed himself in nightclubs. This 
provided excellent opportunities for these police officers to share their personal problems 
and issues with their leader. Affection-based relationships therefore encouraged Mr WQ to 
distribute corrupt benefits (e.g. promotion opportunities) to his loyal followers (Xinhua 
2010a).  
Chen and Chen (2004: 316) argue that socially-expressive activities, such as celebration 
paƌties foƌ ŵaƌƌiages, ďiƌthdaǇs aŶd pƌoŵotioŶs, haǀe a gƌeat iŵpaĐt oŶ ͚affeĐtiǀe tƌust aŶd 
ganqing͛. This is ďeĐause ĐeleďƌatioŶs pƌoǀide good oppoƌtuŶities foƌ loǁer-ranking officials 
to express their good wishes and greetings to their leaders. The Mr WQ case shows that the 
Spring Festival (the Chinese New Year), Mid-Autumn Festival, birthdays and occasions when 
Mr WQ went abroad on official business provided excellent gift-giving opportunities for low- 
and mid-leǀel poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd loĐal ďusiŶesses to seŶd ͚Hongbao͛—red envelopes 
containing money or shopping cards—to Mr WQ (Keyuan 2000; Li 2012). As Bracey (1992) 
states, gifts are converted into reciprocity, making the recipient indebted to the giver. The 
only thing that Mr WQ had to give in return was misuse of power or authority, which was 
also the only thing in which these bribers were interested.  
Obligation-based relational power is generated from the exchange of emotional feelings (e.g. 
work-related problems and issues) between the leader and his or her subordinates (Shang et 
al. 2012). Social and economic transactions create a sense of indebtedness, resulting in a 
felt-obligation-based relationship between two parties (Vanhonacker 2004). For example, 
Mr PC and Mr WQ, two police chiefs, developed a very close working relationship because 
they had worked together for many years. It would have been difficult for Mr WQ to 
establish himself as an anti-crime hero without the assistance of Mr PC. In September 2000, 
with Mr PC's significant contribution, Mr WQ successfully destroyed the Zhang Jun criminal 
sǇŶdiĐate aŶd ŵade hiŵself ChiŶa͛s ŵost ƌeputaďle poliĐe offiĐeƌ (Ifeng 2010; Lu 2010). Mr 
WQ rewarded Mr PC by promoting him from lowly officer all the way to police chief. 
In practice, it is extremely difficult to distinguish ganqing-based relationships from renqing-
based relationships. In most corruption cases, these two types of relationship are simply 
mixed together. As Jiang et al. (2012: 209) argues: 
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͚GuaŶǆi ďased oŶ kiŶship usuallǇ staƌts fƌoŵ ganqing while other kinds of guanxi 
typically start from renqing. However, as time passes, both kinds of guanxi contain both 
ganqing and renqing components. The only distinction is the proportions of ganqing 
and renqing in guanxi. For example, business guanxi usually has less ganqing elements 
thaŶ otheƌ guaŶǆi.͛ 
Indirect relational power, also called network-based relational power, facilitates people who 
did not possess a direct guanxi relationship with Mr WQ to receive corrupt benefits in Mr 
WQ͛s guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌks. As “haŶg et al. (2012) argue, this type of relational power is based on 
mianzi (face). A middleman (A) possesses the ability not only to bring the provider (B) and 
seeker (C) of corrupt benefits together, but also to make B feel obligated to C. The 
relationship between A and B indirectly affects the outcome of the request made by C.  
As Table 1 shows, Mr CWQ was frequently invited to act as middleman when the help seeker 
ǁas Ŷot a ŵeŵďeƌ of Mƌ WQ͛s guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌks. Mƌ CWQ was a billionaire in Chongqing. 
Since 2000, Mr CWQ had created and maintained good guanxi with Mr WQ through 
continuous gift-giving on three types of occasion: special celebrations (e.g. birthdays), 
traditional Chinese festivals (e.g. Spring Festival) and returning from a long distance trip (Li 
2010). Norms of reciprocity in guanxi networks made Mr WQ ƌeluĐtaŶt to saǇ ͚Ŷo͛ to Mƌ 
CWQ͛s ƌeƋuests. If a faǀouƌ ƌeƋuest ǁas Ŷot gƌaŶted as eǆpeĐted, guaŶǆi ƋualitǇ ǁould be 
negatively affected and Mr WQ͛s ƌeputatioŶ iŶ guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌks ǁould ďe seƌiouslǇ daŵaged. 
As a result, people who did not possess guanxi with Mr WQ tended to find a middleman to 
gain job transfers within the Chongqing police system.  
The buying and selling of public offices in Chongqing illustrates the importance of relational 
power in the distribution of government appointments. Guanxi in contemporary China 
exerts corrosive effects on the legal system. The Chongqing crime crackdown was followed 
by the reshuffle of mid- and high-ranking police officers in order to break corrupt guanxi 
networks within the police system and cut mutually-beneficial links between police officials 
and criminals (Liu and Li 2010). 
Corrupt guanxi networks between police officers and locally-based 
criminals 
The establishment of a close guanxi with high-ranking officials not only enables low- and 
mid-level police officers to gain promotions or transfers, but also safeguards their businesses 
with criminals. Unlike corrupt high-ranking government officials who make large amounts of 
money by selling government appointments or associating with legitimate businessmen, 
middle or lower-level police officers who want to earn such benefits have to associate with 
locally-based criminals or illegal entrepreneurs who are also eager to establish close guanxi 
networks with law enforcers (Chin and Godson 2006).  
According to Antonopoulos (2013), the corrupt network between the criminal underworld 
and the political establishment can be created either through clientelistic relationships or 
bribery in the form of money, expensive gifts and/or services, and sex services, or through 
interpersonal, family guanxi links. Drawing on fieldwork data and extensive published 
materials, Wang (2013a) states that police officers in Mr WQ͛s Đoƌrupt guanxi network were 
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largely involved in offering protection for locally-based criminal groups. Wang (2013b) 
describes Mr WQ͛s Đoƌƌupt Ŷetǁoƌk as a ďlaĐk eŵpiƌe ǁhiĐh Đonsists of three tiers. Mr WQ, 
the ͚godfatheƌ͛ of ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s ĐƌiŵiŶal uŶdeƌǁoƌld, sat on the top; the middle level 
consisted of Mr WQ͛s siǆ ͚heaǀeŶlǇ guaƌdiaŶs͛, ǁho ǁeƌe ŵid-level police officers in 
Chongqing; on the bottom were eight organizations with an underworld nature, which used 
to ĐoŶtƌol ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s illegal ŵaƌkets suĐh as gaŵďling, prostitution, and drug trafficking 
and distribution. 
Table 2: The most influential political-criminal nexus in Chongqing headed by Mr WQ9   
Mr WQ:  
 
He served as the deputy head of the Chongqing 
Public Security Bureau from 1992 to 2008 and as 
director of the Chongqing Justice Bureau from 
July 2008 to August 2009. 
Mr WQ was found guilty of: 
1. Taking more than 12 million RMB in bribes 
to facilitate more than 20 officers to gain 
promotions or transfers; to help businessmen 
obtain illegal profits; and to provide 
protection to locally-based organized crime 
groups. Of these bribes, 756,500 RMB came 
from gang members. 
2. Failing to explain the source of assets worth 
10.44 million RMB. 
3. Raping a university student in August 2007. 
Six ‘heavenly guardians’ of Mr WQ’s black empire 
Mr HD: 
·Former deputy head 
of Chongqing’s 
criminal 
investigation 
division (2003-
2009). 
·Bribed Mr WQ with 
90,000 RMB and an 
Omega watch 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Mr LL: 
·Deputy head of the 
city’s drug control 
department (2005-
2008). 
·Bribed Mr WQ with 
400,000 RMB 
between 2005 and 
2008. 
Mr ZL: 
·Deputy head of the 
city’s public 
transport security 
police division 
(2000-2009).  
·Bribed Mr WQ with 
270,000 RMB 
between 2000 and 
2008. 
Mr CT: 
·Deputy head of the 
city’s public security 
police division 
(2007-2009). 
·Bribed Mr WQ with 
60,000 RMB 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Mr XQ: 
·Director of the 
Dianjiang County 
Public Security 
Bureau in 
Chongqing (2007-
2009).  
·Bribed Mr WQ with 
370,000 RMB 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Mr ST: 
·Deputy head of 
Jiangbei district sub-
bureau of the 
Chongqing Public 
Security Bureau 
(2006-2009). 
·Bribed Mr WQ to 
obtain promotion. 
The specific 
information of Mr 
ST’s bribery is not in 
the public domain. 
Eight locally-based criminal organizations which controlled Chongqing’s illegal markets 
 
Mr WT’s Gang 
·Businesses: Monopolizing the 
hog slaughtering and pork 
markets through threats and 
violence. 
·Length of activity: 13 years 
·Size: 23 members 
·Active since: 1996 
 
 
Ms XC’s Gang 
·Business: Gambling 
·Length of activity: 5 years 
·Size: 22 members 
·Active since: 2004 
 
 
Mr CM’s Gang 
·Businesses: Prostitution, dispute 
resolution, gambling, and drug 
trafficking. 
·Length of activity: 8 years 
·Size: 34 members 
·Active since: 2001 
 
 
Mr AX’s Gang 
·Businesses: Drug production and 
trafficking, and illegal sale of 
firearms. 
·Length of activity: 13 years 
·Size: 46 members 
·Active since: 1996 
 
 
Mr WXJ’s Gang 
·Businesses: Gambling and 
prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 8 years 
·Size: 24 members 
·Active since: 2001 
 
 
Wang Sisters’ Gang (Ms WZ 
and Ms WW’s Gang) 
·Business: Prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 15 years 
·Size: over 20 members 
·Active since: 1994 
 
 
Mr YN’s Gang 
·Business: Prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 11 years 
·Size: 31 members 
·Active since: 1998 
 
 
Mr FQ and Mr GGM’s Gang 
·Businesses: Loan sharking, drug 
trafficking, and gambling. 
·Length of activity: 3 years 
·Size: 34 members 
·Active since: 2006 
 
 
Unlike the mainstream viewpoint that Mr WQ protected these locally-based criminal groups 
directly, interview data suggests that, in most circumstances, it was low- and mid-level 
officers rather than Mr WQ himself who provided criminal protection for these criminals and 
                                                          
9
 Table 2 is designed by the author. All the information in this table is from relevant news reports 
released by Xinhua News Agency from June 2009 to February 2012.  
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illegal entrepreneurs.
10
 Mr WQ͛s ŵaiŶ illegal ďusiŶess ǁas the selliŶg of puďliĐ appoiŶtŵeŶts. 
In order to maintain his reputation in guanxi networks, Mr WQ had to follow the principle of 
reciprocity—a key norm in guanxi practice—to return favours and offer gifts to his 
subordinates (bribers) such as securing their promotions and turning a blind eye to their 
corrupt transactions with criminal groups.
11
  
The direct transactions between Mr WQ and gang bosses only happened when Mr WQ͛s 
͚heaǀeŶlǇ guaƌdiaŶs͛ ǁeƌe Ŷot aďle to ŵeet the deŵaŶds of these gang bosses. The Mr WT 
case is a good illustration of how the rule of guanxi obliged Mr WQ to offer corrupt benefits 
to illegal entrepreneurs (see Table 3). Mr WT, a billionaire and notorious gang boss, 
ŵoŶopolized ChoŶgƋiŶg͛s hog slaughteƌiŶg and pork market through threats and violence (Yi 
2010). In mid-December 2003, Mr WDM, Mr WT͛s ďƌotheƌ, assigŶed tǁo gaŶgsteƌs to ͚teaĐh 
a lessoŶ͛ to a pig faƌŵeƌ ǁho ƌefused to sell pigs to the slaughteƌiŶg ĐoŵpaŶǇ oǁŶed ďǇ Mr 
WT͛s gaŶg; this aĐtioŶ eŶded in the death of that farmer (Wang 2009). Immediately after this 
incident, Mr WDM and two gangsters were arrested by the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau.  
In order to help his brother and gang members escape punishment, Mr WT had to make use 
of his guanxi networks and money. At the beginning, Mr WT employed his guanxi networks 
with Mr LZ and Mr YZ, both of whom were senior CID officers, to obtain confidential 
investigative information about this case. But he failed (Xinhua 2009). Mr WT then turned to 
a guanxi middleman, Mr LJ, with whom he had a long-term business guanxi. The long-term 
management of a luxury hotel enabled Mr LJ to create a wide guanxi network with high-
ranking police officers including Mr WQ. Initially, Mr WQ refused to attend a dinner 
organized by Mr LJ (i.e. refused to give mianzi/face to Mr LJ). Then Mr HD, a key member in 
Mr WQ͛s Đoƌƌupt guaŶǆi Ŷetǁoƌk aŶd deputǇ Đhief of the CID, ǁas iŶǀited ďǇ Mr LJ as an 
intermediary to persuade Mr WQ to offer help. After receiving 100,000 RMB, Mr HD 
organized a dinner and Mr WQ, Mr WT, and Mr LJ were invited. A close guanxi with Mr HD 
obliged Mr WQ to provide this favour. Mr WQ appointed Mr HD as a team leader to handle 
this homicide case. Mr HD halted the criminal investigation, and as a result, Mr WDM and his 
gangsters escaped conviction (Xinhua 2010b).
12
 This case illustrates that money is not the 
key factor for a corrupt transaction. Instead, government officials care more about the 
principle of reciprocity or the obligation to save mianzi within guanxi networks. 
                                                          
10
 A journalist, 29 DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, iŶteƌǀieǁ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa. 
11
 Police officers and prosecutors, ϮϬ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭ, foĐus gƌoup disĐussioŶ, ChoŶgƋiŶg, People͛s 
Republic of China. 
12
 The investigation of the case did not resume until the arrest of Mr WQ in 2009. 
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Table 3  
Mr WT’s 
guanxi 
networks 
with police 
officers 
(Wang 2009) 
 
 
This 
illustrates how 
the illegal 
entrepreneur, 
Mr WT, 
employs 
guanxi and 
money to 
interfere with 
criminal 
investigation 
and avoid 
punishment. 
 
 
To sum up, the Chongqing case illustrates that low- and mid-level government officials have 
to employ guanxi networks and money to establish good relationships with high-ranking 
officials in order to gain promotions or transfers and obtain protection for their illicit 
businesses. Meanwhile, the acceptance of favours from others in their network places an 
obligation on high-ranking government officials because they will lose face (dignity or 
prestige) if they fail to provide the benefits the bribers desire. 
Evidence from the Chongqing crime crackdown provides a good opportunity to examine the 
corruption-facilitating role of guanxi. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the negative 
influence of guanxi on the legal system leads to serious corruption, as it results in the rise of 
the market involving the buying and selling of government appointments and the formation 
of a dangerous collaboration between the political establishment and the criminal 
underworld. Police officers act as important suppliers of protection, offering safety and 
business opportunities to gang bosses and illegal entrepreneurs. Guanxi practices, especially 
in law enforcement agencies, facilitate corrupt transactions within and between public and 
private aĐtoƌs, ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs ChiŶa͛s legal iŶstitutioŶs aƌe uŶaďle to pƌoǀide eƋual aŶd 
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sufficient protection for all private property owners. Ineffectual law enforcement prompts 
private individuals and entrepreneurs to seek alternative sources of protection including 
private-illegal and state-illegal enforcement. 
The importance of guanxi in obtaining extra-legal protection 
Evidence from China suggests that the choice of preferred protection and enforcement 
mechanism is affected by guanxi networks. Data gathered during fieldwork in Qufu provides 
an opportunity to verify the second and the third hypotheses. The following three cases are 
selected to investigate how private individuals and entrepreneurs employ guanxi networks 
to secure private protection to cope with goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials͛ eǆtoƌtioŶ, solǀe the pƌoďleŵ 
of being stalked, and enforce loan repayment. 
Coping with government officials’ extortion 
In China, there are no standard rules on how to prepare company accounts, especially for 
private companies, thus it is very easy for tax auditors to find faults with income tax if they 
wish (Chang 2011). Private companies with sound business performance are normally 
targeted. Two types of counter-measures are applied by most entrepreneurs to confront 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials͛ eǆtoƌtioŶ.  
The first strategy is the use of gang protection based on the guanxi network. Businessman A 
tends to ask for help from his friend (a reputable gang boss Z) to deal with the troubles 
brought by corrupt taxmen. A phone call from gang boss Z is enough to end the extortion 
activities. As businessman A says: 
͚What theǇ ;taǆ auditoƌsͿ ǁaŶt is ŵoŶeǇ…if theǇ fiŶd theiƌ aĐtiǀities ǁill ƌesult iŶ a 
terrible outcome like their families are threatened, all of them will stop their dirty 
ďusiŶesses͛. 13 
The involvement of street gangs in fighting against extortion by the tax bureau is not unusual, 
where the political and legal system fails to clearly specify criteria which local governments 
must follow and to strictly enforce these criteria. The behaviours of these unlawful 
protectors include threatening phone calls, messages and unwanted appearances at an 
offiĐial͛s hoŵe. The ŵaiŶ Đost of usiŶg eǆtƌa-legal protection, suggested by businessman A, is 
ganqing touzi, which refers to the investment in personal relationships to build a close or 
good guanxi with street gangsters.  
The second strategy is the use of guanxi networks to secure protection from government 
officials. Some local businessmen refuse to purchase protection from gangsters because 
they believe that street gangs are untrustworthy, and purchasing illegal services from them 
will diminish their reputation in the local community.
14
 For example, businessman B, who is 
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an influential entrepreneur, is more likely to use his personal guanxi network with 
government officials to resolve extortion by taxmen. As he describes: 
͚NoƌŵallǇ eǆpeŶsiǀe drinks and food are enough to resolve these troubles. If not, I have 
to reply on personal relationships with senior government officials. Last year, 
inspection by tax auditors was so frequent. They found new problems in my income tax 
every time. This meant ǁhat theǇ ǁaŶted ǁeƌe ŵoƌe thaŶ dƌiŶks aŶd sŵall gifts… IŶ 
order to stop their disturbances, I turned to my friend X who is the head of the local 
government. My friend X helped me organize a dinner with the head auditor. From 
then on, there were fewer troubles because they realized that I had a close guanxi 
Ŷetǁoƌk ǁith the loĐal goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛.15 
The background of these two businessmen may be useful to interpret why two wholly 
different types of counter-measures are applied. Businessman A operates a medium-size 
enterprise which is one of the fastest-growing companies in the local community, while a 
private company owned by businessman B is a leading enterprise which was owned by the 
local government and privatized in 2001. Businessman B is also a member of the local 
people͛s ĐoŶgƌess. The soĐial status of ďusiŶessŵaŶ B has eŶaďled hiŵ to estaďlish soĐial 
connections with local authorities; as a result, the use of guanxi networks with government 
officials is regarded as the best strategy in preventing government offiĐials͛ eǆtoƌtioŶ. BǇ 
contrast, businessman A, who lacks a close guanxi with government officials but has a good 
relationship with gang bosses, is more likely to purchase quasi law enforcement services 
from the gang.  
Solving the problem of being stalked 
In China, legal sanctions and laws to protect the victims of stalking have been criticized as 
lacking. Victims of stalking who seek public protection from the legal system are often 
iŶfoƌŵed ďǇ state authoƌities that a poliĐe offiĐeƌ͛s dutǇ to iŶteƌǀeŶe does not arise until the 
perpetrator has harmed them physically (Bradfield 1998). Interview data suggests that the 
possession of close guanxi with government agencies is inadequate to deal with the problem 
of being stalked.  
Businessman C, a successful entrepreneur, operates a private company which has been 
ranked as one of the largest construction firms in the city. The secret of his success is 
nothing more than the creation of close guanxi relationships with the local government. In 
2012, businessman C was stalked by unknown persons and received a series of threatening 
calls and messages. Using mobile phone surveillance systems, police officer D, a good friend 
of businessman C, provided the details of the persons (gangsters E and F) who made 
threatening calls. The police officer suggested that a face-to-face meeting with gangsters E 
and F was not a safe choice for businessman C. Then a reputable gang boss, G, introduced by 
one friend of businessman C, was invited to have a talk with E and F in order to find the 
person (businessman K) who was responsible. After obtaining the information, the problem 
of being stalked (which was caused by a commercial dispute) was finally resolved when a 
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middleman, M, was involved in the talks between businessmen C and K.
16
 This is a perfect 
example of a complex web of connections (with police officers, businessmen and gangsters) 
successfully operating in a guanxi network.  
The lack of anti-stalking laws results in two unintended consequences. On the one hand, 
stalking becomes the most effective means of enforcement applied by criminal groups, 
espeĐiallǇ uŶlaǁful eŶfoƌĐeƌs. Foƌ eǆaŵple, ŵost ͚Ŷail households͛ ǁill agƌee to ĐhaŶge theiƌ 
residences after the experience of being stalked. On the other hand, victims of stalking who 
lack public protection have to purchase extra-legal protection, which facilitates the rise of 
the criminal protection industry.   
Debt collection mechanisms: how do underground banks enforce loan 
repayment? 
UŶdeƌgƌouŶd ďaŶks aƌe illegal ďut aĐtiǀe iŶ ChiŶa͛s coastal provinces where private firms 
prosper (Tsai 2004). The illegal status of underground lending organizations makes them 
ŵoƌe likelǇ to ͚ƌelǇ oŶ tƌust, ƌeputatioŶ oƌ ĐoeƌĐioŶ aŶd ǀioleŶĐe foƌ paǇŵeŶt of loaŶs͛ 
(Ayyagari et al. 2010: 3055). Trust and reputation in the guanxi network usually provide 
sufficient motivation to persuade underground borrowers to repay their loans. Where this 
proves insufficient, illegal bankers are forced to use the private enforcement services 
offered by criminal groups. The following paragraphs analyse how the debt collection 
mechanisms of underground banks work. 
Step one: urging the debtor to fulfil his debt through guanxi practice. Access to underground 
lenders is usually based on networking through mutual friends (Ayyagari et al. 2010). When 
the payment is overdue, the introducer becomes the first enforcer to persuade the debtor 
to fulfil his responsibility. Failure to fulfil an obligation is closely associated with losing face 
(mianzi) or external prestige in guanxi networks.
17
 In order to protect his mianzi or dignity, 
the debtor tends to make the loan payments.  
Step two: the involvement of debt collectors (street gangsters) in claiming loans from debtors. 
Underground banks usually hire debt collectors—most of whom are gangsters—to claim 
loans from debtors if guanxi practice does not work.
18
 Stalking, coercion and violence are 
major means of enforcement employed by debt collectors. However, the involvement of 
unlawful enforcers may be not effective in some situations, such as when the debt collector 
is the friend of both moneylender and debtor.
19
 The debt collector will lose his mianzi or 
prestige if he carries out enforcement duties regardless of the existing guanxi relationships. 
The failure of criminal enforcement compels moneylenders to resort to the courts. 
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Step three: debt recovery through the courts. Although underground banks are not 
sanctioned by the government, the loan contract signed by both parties is sufficient for 
underground moneylenders to recover their debts. The information about high interest 
rates is not included in the contract, but the amount of money in the loan contract is a total 
of principal and interest.
20
 Even if the judges decide in favour of the plaintiffs, debt recovery 
is much slower than the use of debt collectors. For this reason, resorting to the courts is 
usually not regarded as the preferred choice. 
To sum up: consistent with the second hypothesis, the fieldwork data suggests that extra-
legal protection and quasi law enforcement are frequently used by private individuals and 
entrepreneurs to pƌeǀeŶt goǀeƌŶŵeŶt offiĐials͛ eǆtoƌtioŶ, defeŶd theŵselǀes agaiŶst 
stalking and improve the efficiency of debt collection. Interview data also shows that the 
purchase of extra-legal protection by entrepreneurs is largely based on trust and reputation 
in the guanxi network, which is consistent with the third hypothesis.  
Extra-legal pƌoteĐtioŶ is a positioŶal good, ͚a good [is] ǀaluaďle to soŵe people oŶlǇ oŶ 
ĐoŶditioŶ that otheƌs do Ŷot haǀe it͛ (Hollis 1982: 236). Protection seekers who fail to 
establish guanxi networks with extra-legal protectors or who cannot find a proper 
middleman will find themselves unable to obtain reliable services, and thus become more 
likely to be extorted by illegal enforcers. Developing and maintaining guanxi with unlawful 
protectors, however, costs time, energy and money. 
Using guanxi in the extra-legal protection market has both favourable and unfavourable 
consequences: on the one hand, it guarantees the quality of services, and thus induces 
individuals or entrepreneurs to purchase extra-legal protection. On the other hand, the 
guanxi network sometimes makes the services ineffective, for example when criminal 
enforcers who are invited to enforce loan repayment belong to the same network as the 
debtors, which would make enforcement extremely difficult. 
Conclusion 
This papeƌ deŵoŶstƌates hoǁ guaŶǆi distoƌts ChiŶa͛s legal sǇsteŵ aŶd faĐilitates the ƌise of 
extra-legal protectors. The Chongqing case illustrates that relational power, rather than the 
rule of law, has always been the key to getting things done in China. Relational power gives 
rise to illegal job markets (the buying and selling of government appointments) and builds a 
political-criminal nexus. When the state is weak, private individuals and entrepreneurs tend 
to employ extra-legal protectors to protect rights, facilitate transactions and deal with 
government extortion. Moreover, in order to obtain cost-effective services, the use of extra-
legal protection depends on existing guanxi networks with illegal protectors. 
The study of extra-legal protection in contemporary China needs to focus on both private-
illegal and state-illegal suppliers. Street gangsters that have established their reputation are 
frequently invited by businessmen to deal with troubles such as commercial disputes and 
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official extortion (also see Zhao 2012). Corrupt government officials, especially, police 
officers, have become key protectors in the criminal underworld, safeguarding criminal 
groups and their illicit businesses. These officials distribute unlawful protection services 
through guanxi networks, enabling entrepreneurs to obtain business opportunities and deal 
with problems brought by local government officials.  
Guanxi in contemporary China is a double-edged sword. It provides a positive complement 
to the formal institutional framework, but it conflicts violently with the rule of law. This 
ĐoŶfliĐt thƌeateŶs to uŶdeƌŵiŶe ChiŶa͛s legal sǇsteŵ. WheŶ the estaďlishŵeŶt of a soĐialist 
market economy is not accompanied by an efficient legal framework protecting law 
enforcers and government officials from the demands of guanxi networks, the negative 
effects of guanxi become more obvious. The corruption, bribery and organized crime 
facilitated by guanxi are hindering the development of rule of law in China.  
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